![]() ![]() Simon Gächter thanks CES Munich for the hospitality he enjoyed while writing this paper. We also would like to thank the Universities of Agricultural Sciences Brijansk (Kokino), Samara (Ust-Kinel), the Belgorod State Technical Academy of Building Materials, the All-Russian Distance Institute of Finance and Economics (ARDIFE) in Kusk and the Samara State University for supporting us with the necessary infrastructure and Hans Kolb-Wellpappe Ltd for the donation of cardboards used in the experiments. Our results contribute to the current social capital debate. ![]() ![]() Here we detect no differences in the game without punishment and strong differences in the presence of punishment. Our second study is a public goods experiment with and without punishment. Our first study elicits trust and cooperative preferences in a public goods game and finds almost no differences. We present two experimental studies from Switzerland, Byelorussia and Russia to support this argument. We argue that research should shift focus toward informal sanctions. Most of current research focuses on trust. Two economically important elements of social capital are trust and disciplining free-riders. The insights are also applicable to social funds, decentralisation and participatory projects. Our results identify a problem in combining selection and delivery tasks. Selection distortions are similar but intermediaries divert more when they have selection power (correctly anticipating that gratitude for selection will reduce complaints). In our data random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. In the other selection is random - as by an uninformed donor. In one treatment the intermediary selects recipients. We design an experimental game representing the donor's problem. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (for example, by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. These recipients may, however, withhold complaints to 'thank' the intermediary for selecting them. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. In addition to shedding light on the reasons why democracy weakens revolutionary attitudes, our analysis provides some clues to understand the recent increase in the support for revolution in democratic countries.ĭonors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. We find empirical support for all arguments. This rests on three arguments: that (1) majority rule guarantees that the number of dissatisfied people is relatively low, (2) periodic elections allow dissatisfied people to hope for a change in the leadership within a reasonable period of time, and (3) power-sharing institutions diminish the negative impact of an unwanted government on people. Focusing on the support for revolution in 15 European democracies, this article re-examines the classic prediction that democratic systems reduce political grievances. Indeed, democratic systems may have a negative effect on the support for revolution, as predicted by democratic theory, but a positive effect on opportunities for revolutions on the other part. This absence of relationship does not mean that democratic theory is entirely wrong. Our data allow us to identify resignation as the driving force behind this phenomenon.Ĭontrary to a classic prediction of democratic theory, empirical studies do not find that democratic systems produce internal peace. ![]() Surprisingly, however the frequency of conflicts decreases with the degree of inequality. We observe frequent conflicts, where, as expected, disadvantaged groups “burn” more money than advantaged groups. Treatments differ in the degree of social inequality set between the two groups by attributing to some subjects (the advantaged group) a larger share of the price than other subjects (the disadvantaged group) for the same amount of effort. In a second stage players can coordinate with the other members of their group to reduce (“burn”) the other group members’ payoff. First, subjects play a proportional rent-seeking game to share a prize. Our experiment consists of a two-stage game. Inter-group conflicts require both coordination and necessary financial material resources. Second, we investigate the factors that make preferences for conflict translate into actions. First, we experimentally investigate whether inequality is a driving force of inter-group conflicts. In this paper, we study the determinants of inter-groups conflicts, focusing our attention on the role of inequality aversion. ![]()
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